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Abstract 
  The paper develops a procedure for decomposing changes in agricultural price gaps, 
defined as the difference between a commodity’s domestic producer and border prices.  Two 
decomposition approaches are presented, depending on whether policy allows transmission from 
changes in trade prices and exchange rates to domestic prices.  The methods allow one to isolate 
and measure the effect on the price gap of changes in agricultural policy versus non-policy 
variables.  The decomposition procedure is demonstrated in an example involving the price gap 
for Russian poultry in the late 1990s.  The results are consistent with the argument that for 
developing and transition economies, the main cause of changes in price gaps is incomplete 
transmission of changes in exchange rates to domestic prices, resulting not from policy 
intervention, but rather from undeveloped market infrastructure.  
   4
Introduction 
  This paper develops a procedure for decomposing changes in agricultural price gaps.  The 
price gap is defined as the difference between the domestic producer price for a commodity and 
its border price expressed in domestic currency.  Price gaps are important as indicators of the 
degree to which countries are integrated into world agricultural markets, as well as being the 
fundamental information revealed by standard measures of trade protection.  Price gaps are also 
a key element in the most widely-used measure of countries’ support to agriculture − producer 
support estimates (PSEs).  Identifying and measuring why price gaps change, that is, determining 
the degree to which changes in specific variables drive movement in price gaps, therefore 
provides important information for agricultural policy analysis.  Our decomposition procedure 
focuses on separating out and measuring how changes in agriculture-targeted policies (such as 
import tariff rates), as well as changes in nonpolicy variables (such as border prices and the 
exchange rate), contribute to changes in price gaps. 
  Strong concern currently exists in economic development circles for developing 
countries’ capacity to engage profitably in foreign trade.  For example, the Global Monitoring 
Report 2005 put out by the World Bank and IMF highlights the “behind-the-border” problems in 
developing countries that retard trade, especially in agriculture, and thereby diminish trade’s 
potential to raise incomes and contribute to growth.  The trade-constraining problems largely 
involve undeveloped physical, commercial, and institutional infrastructure which works to 
isolate regional markets within countries from the world market.  The report argues for an aid 
strategy, called “Aid for trade,” whereby assistance focuses on improving countries’ trade 
infrastructure and capacity.  A conference held by the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development in May 2002, “Agricultural Trade Reform, Adjustment, and Poverty,” focused   5
on similar problems and issues for developing and transition economies (OECD 2003). 
Deficient infrastructure and other behind-the-border obstacles to trade can create gaps 
between domestic producer prices and border prices.  Our procedure for decomposing changes in 
price gaps provides a mechanism for empirically measuring the magnitude of this problem.  The 
paper in fact argues that the major cause of changes in agricultural price gaps for developing and 
transition economies is not changes in agriculture-targeted policies.  Rather, the main cause 
appears to be poor transmission from changes in border prices and, especially, exchange rates to 
domestic producer prices, where the weak transmission is caused not by policy, but rather by 
undeveloped market infrastructure.  If so, strengthening macroeconomic stability and improving 
domestic infrastructure might do more to reduce price gaps, and their economic effects, than 
liberalizing agricultural trade policies.  Given that PSEs were created to measure the effect of 
agriculture-targeted policies on agricultural producers and markets, the above argument also 
raises the question of the appropriate way to compute and interpret PSEs. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The second section examines the price gap and its 
main elements.  The third and fourth sections present two different methods for decomposing 
changes in price gaps, with the choice of method depending on the type of trade policy that exists 
for a given commodity.  The key feature behind this dichotomy is whether policy allows any 
transmission of changes in border prices and exchange rates to domestic producer prices.  The 
fifth section demonstrates the decomposition method when policy allows transmission, by using 
it to decompose the change in the price gap for Russian poultry over the period 1997-99.  The 
sixth section discusses some limitations of the decomposition procedure, while the conclusion 
summarizes the paper’s main findings. 
   6
The Price Gap 
  This paper focuses on decomposing the change in the gap between domestic and border 
prices.  However, before developing the decomposition procedure, it would be useful to examine 
the price gap itself and its components.   
The price gap (G) for an agricultural commodity in a country is calculated as 
     X P P G
w d − =                             (1) 
 
where    G is the price gap; 
              P
d  is the domestic producer (farm gate) price; 
              P
w  is the border price expressed in foreign currency; 
              X  is the exchange rate. 
  The domestic producer price for an imported commodity can be expressed as 
 P
d  =  P
w X (1 + t)  +  C
m  −  C
d  +  D
p                                                                       (2) 
where  t represents policies, expressed as a tariff rate equivalent, that create a gap between the 
              import and domestic price; 
 
 C
m is the transport/transaction cost of moving imports from the importation site to the site 
                  within the country where imports compete with domestic output; 
 
 C
d is the transport/transaction cost of moving domestic output from the farm to the site 
     within the country where domestic output competes with imports; 
 
 D
p is a residual between P
d and the other variables in the right side of the equation. 
 
If the commodity is exported rather than imported, P
d is the same as in equation (2), except that 
C
m drops out and C
d is the transport/transaction cost of moving domestic output from the farm to 
the exportation site.  t now represents policies that create a gap between the export and domestic 
price, such as an export tax. 
 Substituting  P
d from equation (2) into equation (1) gives 
           G  =  P
w X t  +  C
m  −  C
d  +  D
p                                                                                  (3) 
The price gap G consists of three parts.  P
w X t  results from policy intervention; C
m  −  C
d gives   7
the difference between internal transport/transaction costs for imported and domestic product; 
and D
p gives that part of the price gap that cannot be attributed to either policies or 
transport/transaction costs. 
  We call D
p the price disparity.  If the domestic market for a traded commodity is in 
equilibrium, such that no profitable arbitrage opportunity exists involving the border and 
domestic price, D
p equals 0.  However, for specific country-commodity pairings at any given 
time, market disequilibrium might exist, such that D
p ≠   0.  This is especially true for developing 
and transition economies, which have poor physical, commercial, and institutional infrastructure.  
Undeveloped physical infrastructure involves deficiencies such as weak transportation and 
storage, while poor commercial and institutional infrastructure involves deficiencies such as 
weak systems of market information and commercial law, the latter failing to enforce contracts 
and protect property.
1 
Deficient infrastructure can have two main effects.  First, it can result in high internal 
transport/transaction costs for agricultural and food products (as represented in equation (2) by 
C
m and C
d).  Second, it can create the market imperfection of incomplete information.  In 
particular, producers in isolated areas might be unaware of prices (and especially price 
movements) in the domestic markets where their output competes with imports.  Isolated 
producers often have to make commercial commitments before the final transaction prices in 
distant markets are known.  Deficient infrastructure also creates market rigidities, a likely effect 
being lags in contracting and transport.  Barrett (2001), Barrett and Li (2002), and Fackler and 
Goodwin (2001) discuss how poor market infrastructure can create imperfect information, and 
argue that the consequence can be price disequilibrium that lasts for extended periods of time.
2  
Barrett and Li describe the situation of D
p ≠   0 as imperfect integration.   8
  The method we will develop for decomposing changes in G does not rest on the 
assumption that price disparities exist.  Rather, our method allows their existence, and provides a 
framework to determine whether they exist.  A key element in our decomposition of changes in 
G is the degree of transmission of changes in border prices and exchange rates to domestic 
producer prices.  A relationship clearly exists between incomplete transmission and price 
disparities (Colman). 
This paper focuses on the change in G.  The transport/transaction costs C
m and C
d could 
change for a commodity, such that their change alters G.  Nonetheless, we assume that C
m and 
C
d are fixed, such that they are not included in the decomposition of changes in G.
3  
Alternatively we could assume C
m  =  C
d (when the commodity is imported).  The main reason 
for these assumptions is to simplify the derivation of the decomposition equations.  Given that 
C
m and C
d are simply additive variables in equation (2), including them in the decomposition 
would be easy analytically and methodologically (though computing their values in empirical 
work could be challenging).  However, including these variables in the derivation of the 
decomposition equations would create too much clutter.  Given that C
m and C
d drop out of our 
decomposition of the change in G (because of our assumptions), we decompose G consisting of 
the following elements:  
  G  =  P
w X t  +  D
p                                                                                                      (4)  
   
Decomposition Without Transmission 
  We begin deriving the method for decomposing changes in G not with G expressed as in 
equation (4), but rather with G expressed as in equation (1), that is, with G  =  P
d  − P
w X.  Work 
by the Organization for Cooperation and Development (OECD) on PSEs provides a base for   9
developing methods to decompose price gaps.  The PSE for a commodity measures the value of 
monetary transfers to its producers from a given set of agricultural policies in a given year.  The 
PSE consists of two main elements: state budgetary support to producers and market price 
support (M).  M equals the difference between the domestic producer price and border price for 
the commodity expressed in domestic currency.  The latter in turn equals the border price in 
foreign currency times the exchange rate.  For the purpose of determining the decomposition of 
the change in M,  M  =  P
d  −  P
w X.  M in the PSE therefore corresponds to the price gap as 
given in equation (1). 
  In addition to computing PSEs for its member, and certain nonmember, countries, OECD 
decomposes changes in PSEs.  OECD’s decomposition for M (equation (1) above) is given by 
   •
• •
− = X P S P S M
w d
X P P
w d          ( 5 )  
 
where a dot above a variable gives the percent change in the variable, and  d P S  and  X Pw S  give 
the shares of P
d and (P




The OECD decomposition method treats the three right-side variables (P
d, P
w, and X ) as 
being independent.  This issue is most relevant for P
d.  Under certain government policies, P
d is 
independent of P
w and X, an example being a managed price policy whereby the government 
defends a predetermined price through market intervention.  For other policies, such as an import 
tariff, P
d is not independent of P
w and X.  However, the OECD decomposition method does not 
have the objective of generating a decomposition whereby the right-side variables are all 
independent.  OECD also does not use the decomposition to isolate and measure the effects of 
changes in policy variables versus nonpolicy-determined variables.  Rather, the purpose of the 
decomposition is to determine how M changes in response to a change in these three variables,   10
ignoring the question of any possible relationship between them. 
  The OECD method for decomposing changes in M, however, can be used as the starting 
point for a procedure for decomposing changes in price gaps, whereby the decomposition 
variables are all independent, and policy-determined variables are distinguishable from 
nonpolicy variables.  In fact, the OECD method for decomposing changes in M can serve as the 
exact procedure for decomposing changes in price gaps when government policies make P
d 
independent of P
w and X; that is, when policy precludes any transmission of changes in P
w and X 
to P
d.  This condition holds under the following policies: managed prices, trade quotas, and state 
trading. 
   A policy of managed prices by its very nature insulates domestic producer prices from 
changes in P
w and X.
6  A policy of trade quotas also “fixes” domestic producer prices, in that the 
quota volume interacts with domestic supply and demand for a commodity to determine the 
domestic price, independent of the trade price and exchange rate.  Likewise, state trading in its 
most typical form, whereby a government agency determines the volume of a commodity to be 
exported or imported, can act like a quota (and may be tied to official quotas), again insulating P
d 
from changes in P
w and X.
7 
  With all the above policies, the policy essentially determines the domestic producer price 
for the commodity.  The variable P
d therefore can represent the policy that “fixes” the domestic 
producer price.  Similarly, the change in M in equation (5) – or alternatively the change in G – 
from a change in P
d can measure the effect of the change in the policy (such as the managed 
price level or import quota volume) on the price gap. 
OECD has recently been broadening its analysis of how policy can affect market price 
support, which is equally relevant to analysis of how policy affects price gaps.  Tangermann   11
(2003) argues that government policies can provide support either explicitly or implicitly.  
Policies involving managed prices, trade quotas, and state trading support producers explicitly, 
because as explained above, the policy directly determines P
d; or alternatively, a change in the 
managed price level or quota volume directly changes P
d, which in turn changes M (or G).  With 
these policies, changes in P
w and X also change M, but not by changing P
d.  Rather, changes in 
P
w and X alter the gap between the domestic price and border price expressed in domestic 
currency.  Tangermann argues that the resulting change in M can nonetheless be attributed to 
policy, but the effect is implicit rather than explicit.  The condition that allows the change in P
w 
and X to change M (or G) is that a policy exists that “fixes” P
d; or alternatively, a policy is in 
place which creates a price gap, and the change in P
w or X changes the price gap.  The implicit 
policy effect therefore can occur without a change in the policy.
8 
  
Decomposition with Transmission 
The decomposition method just discussed is appropriate for policies which, by fixing 
producer prices, allow no transmission from changes in P
w and X to P
d.  If, however, policies do 
allow transmission from P
w and X to P
d, then P
d is not independent of P
w and X.  OECD’s 
method for decomposing the change in M therefore will not capture that dependency.  Policies 
that allow transmission from P
w and X to P
d are trade tariffs, tariff rate quotas, technical barriers 
to trade, and (of course) a policy of free trade.
9 
The method for decomposing changes in price gaps when policy allows transmission is 
much more relevant to current and future circumstances than the method previously discussed 
involving policies that preclude transmission from changes in P
w and X to P
d.  The Uruguay 
Round Agreement on Agriculture banned import quotas, non-tariff measures maintained through   12
state trading enterprises, and most other forms of non-tariff barriers to trade, and in general 
required countries to tariffy border measures.  Also, when developing and transition economies 
support their agriculture, they usually use tariffs as their main support instrument, one reason 
being that they cannot afford the expensive price and income support policies prevalent in OECD 
countries in the postwar period.
10 
 
Reasons Price Gap can Change   
When P
d is not an independent variable in the decomposition, we wish to replace it with a 
variable directly representing the policy (such as a tariff rate).  As with policies that do not allow 
transmission, policies that allow transmission can have both explicit and implicit effects.  For 
example, with an ad valorem tariff, a change in the tariff rate would result in an explicit policy 
effect on G.  On the other hand, a rise in P
w or X would increase the gap between P
d and (P
w X) 
in absolute value, even if the tariff rate remained unchanged.  (With complete transmission from 
P
w and X to P
d, a given percent rise in P
w or X would increase both P
d and G by that very 
percent.)  In this case, policy changes the price gap because the ∆P
w or ∆X interacts with an 
existing, but unchanged, tariff.  We wish to model the policy variable in a way that allows us to 
isolate and measure both the explicit and implicit policy effects from changes in variables on G. 
  When policy allows transmission, price gaps can change not only because of changes 
involving policy (both the explicit and implicit effects), but also because of undeveloped market 
infrastructure.  This can reduce the transmission of changes in P
w and X to P
d.
11  The change in 
P
w or X is the active element in the change in G, but this change by itself cannot change G.  
Rather, the change in P
w or X combines with incomplete transmission, caused by poor 
infrastructure, to change G.  We call this the incomplete transmission effect on G.  This effect is   13
defined to exist only when agricultural policy allows transmission from P
w and X to P
d; 
undeveloped infrastructure, rather than policy, creates the low transmission.  Note that the 
incomplete transmission effect can occur without a conventional trade or support policy even 
existing, much less changing.  The incomplete transmission creates (or adds to) a price disparity 
between domestic and border prices (D
p as discussed earlier) − a gap between domestic and 
border prices not explained by policy or the difference in transaction costs between imports and 
domestic output. 
A feature of developing and transition economies is that they can have highly fluctuating 
exchange rates.
12  Big changes in exchange rates can combine with poor transmission from 
deficient infrastructure to become the dominant cause of changes in these countries’ price gaps.  
Harley (1996), Liefert et al. (1996), the OECD country studies on Russian and Ukrainian 
agriculture (1998, 2004), and Melyukhina (2002) discuss the possibility of an incomplete 
transmission effect for transition economies, and especially the role played by fluctuating 
exchange rates.  World commodity prices also fluctuate.  For example, the average annual 
change in world prices for wheat, pork and refined sugar over 1986-2002 was 20, 15, and 16 
percent, respectively (ERS).  Given the degree to which developing and transition economy 
exchange rates can swing, as well as the extent to which world commodity prices can vary, a 
method for decomposing changes in PSEs that can separate out the implicit policy effect and 
incomplete transmission effect on price gaps, both of which are driven by changes in P
w and X, 
would appear to be useful. 
  To summarize, the key empirical features of developing and transition economies that 
can combine to drive major changes in the price gap are: 
(1)  import tariffs are the main agricultural support policy, such that policy does not 
preclude price transmission;   14
 
(2) undeveloped physical, commercial, and institutional infrastructure reduces 
transmission of changes in border prices and exchange rates to domestic producer 
prices; 
 
(3) exchange rates can fluctuate considerably. 
When policy allows transmission from changes in P
w and X to P
d, OECD’s method for 
decomposing changes in market price support (M) is insufficient for decomposing changes in 
price gaps (as well as M), especially if policy analysis of the decomposition is desired.  By not 
containing the policy variable in the decomposition, the approach cannot measure the isolated 
effect of a policy change on the price gap.  Also, by ignoring any transmission from P
w and X to 
P
d, the effect of ∆P
w and ∆X on M (G) is overstated, and will usually even have the wrong sign.
13  
The method also cannot isolate the effect on M (G) from ∆P
w and ∆X interacting with an 
existing ad valorem tariff (the implicit policy effect).  Nor can it isolate the effect of ∆P
w and ∆X 
on M (G) which results from incomplete transmission to P
d resulting not from policy, but from 
undeveloped market infrastructure. 
Although OECD’s decomposition does not allow one to isolate and measure the 
incomplete transmission effect on market price support, in its calculation and decomposition of 
PSEs for all types of economies, OECD includes the entire price gap in market price support, 
regardless of cause.  PSE were created to measure the effect of government policies on 
agricultural producers and markets.  The incomplete transmission effect resulting from deficient 
infrastructure can cause M to change without any change in government support policies, or 
without any policies even existing.  Whether or not this effect should be considered as a reason 
why M (and thereby the PSE) can change depends on how one defines and interprets PSEs.  The 
counterpart of this issue for the static PSE measured for a specific year is whether the entire price 
gap should be included in the market price support part of the PSE regardless of cause, or   15
whether market price support should capture only that part of the price gap resulting from 
“conventional” policy intervention.  In terms of equation (4), should M equal only P
w X t or 
should it include the price disparity D
p?  In its country studies on Russia (OECD 1998) and 
Ukraine (done in collaboration with the World Bank, World Bank and OECD 2004) and 
Melyukhina (2002), the OECD acknowledges the incomplete transmission effect and in effect 
accepts the legitimacy of including the entire price gap in the measurement of market price 
support for transition economies. 
 
Decomposition Method 
Ad Valorem Tariff. 
This section develops a method for decomposing changes in price gaps when policy 
allows transmission from changes in P
w and X to P
d.  We begin by deriving the decomposition 
equation when an ad valorem tariff exists, and then examine how the decomposition should be 
altered when other policies are operative.  The derivation begins with the equation that gives the 
price gap:  
X P P G
w d − =             ( 6 )  
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 , where t is the tariff rate.   16
 
)] 1 ( [ t X P
w +  is the duty included landed price (henceforth called simply landed price). 
It gives the value of the imported good immediately after it clears customs, and thereby equals 
the cif (cost, insurance, freight) value plus the tariff.  In a well-functioning market economy, and 
assuming that internal transport/transaction costs for imports are the same as for domestic output, 
this value should determine the domestic producer price for the commodity (or if the imported 
good is processed, the value of the primary product embodied in the import should determine the 
domestic price for the primary product).  Introducing the landed price into equation (8) fulfills 
our objective of inserting the tariff as a policy variable into the decomposition analysis. 
In the term  
  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)] 1 ( [
)] 1 ( [
t X P
t X P P P
w
w d d
   , we can isolate the subterm 
     •
•




 . This 
subterm gives the price transmission elasticity (PTE) between the landed price and the domestic 
producer price.  We define e as the PTE, such that  
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The presence of the PTE (e) in the decomposition equation will allow analysis and 
measurement of the effect on G of incomplete transmission from ∆P
w and ∆X to P
d (the 
incomplete transmission effect).  In order to isolate the effect of incomplete transmission, we 
insert for the PTE not e, but rather (e + k – k), where 
k  =  1  –  e                             (11)  
e  +  k  =  1                             (12)   17
 
We can then express the decomposition equation as 
             • • •
+ − − + + = ∆ )] 1 ( [ )] 1 ( [ ) ( t X P k P X P X P t X P k e P G
w d w w w d               (13) 
                             A                                   B                       C 
The letters below the equation identify its three right side terms.  If transmission from change in 
the landed price to domestic price were complete (e = 1, such that k = 0), then term C in the 
equation drops out.  Assume that transmission is incomplete, such that 0 < e, k < 1.  The logic of 
our decomposition approach is that it isolates and measures the effect on G assuming that 
transmission is complete (as measured by terms A + B), as well as the effect on G from the 
incomplete transmission that in fact exists (as measured by term C).  The sum of the two parts 
gives the net effect based on the actual value of e. 
Term A gives ∆P
d if transmission from 
     •
+ )] 1 ( [ t X P
w  to P
d were complete, while term B 
gives ∆(P
w X).  Term A minus term B therefore gives ∆G if transmission were complete.  Term 
C measures the degree to which P
d, as well as G, fail to change to the maximum extent possible 
because of incomplete transmission, or put differently, it measures the degree to which 
incomplete transmission cuts into this potential change.  Note that the absolute value of the 
degree to which P
d fails to change by the maximum possible because of incomplete transmission 
exactly equals the absolute value of the degree to which G also fails to change by the maximum 
possible.  For example, if the maximum possible rise in P
d with full transmission from an 
increase in [P
w X (1 + t)] is 100, but P
d in fact increases by only 80, then the difference between 
the maximum possible rise in G and its actual rise will also be 20. 
We follow the OECD decomposition practice of decomposing the percent change in G 
(
•
G ), rather than the absolute change in G (∆G).  The next step in deriving the decomposition   18
equation therefore is to divide through by G  =  P
d – P
w X.  Although e + k = 1, the term (e + k) is 
kept in the equation for illustrative purposes. 
X P P
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                      A       B            C 
The purpose of the decomposition equation is to allow us to measure the shares of 
•
G  
which are caused by, and therefore can be attributed to, 
•
w P , 
•
X , and 
•
t.  This requires that in the 
final form of the decomposition equation, no term contains more than one of these variables 
expressed as a percent change (with a dot above), and no term exists containing the percent 
change of either a sum or product of two or more of these variables.  In terms A and C, the 
additive term (1 + t) exists within the larger term 
     •
+ )] 1 ( [ t X P
w .  We want to break the term 
     •
+ )] 1 ( [ t X P
w  into its two additive parts.  This is done by using the result that the percent change 
of a sum of two numbers equals the sum of the of the percent change in each number, weighted 
by each number’s share in their sum.  This gives the following:  
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The letters under each main term once again identify that term.  The next step is to deal 
with the percent change of a product of two or more variables.  Attributing the share of   19
individual variables to the change in the product of the variables appears to be a problem without 
a definite mathematical solution.  In its decomposition of the change in market price support, 
OECD confronts the same issue.  We therefore use OECD’s approach for handling the problem.  
In each case where the percent change in the product of two or more variables appears in 
equation (15), say 
   •
X P
w  in term D, the percent change term is preceded by the simple product of 
the variables in question (in this case (P
w X)).  This is because in each case the ultimate value 
being computed is the change in the product of the variables, which can be computed by 
multiplying the initial product of the variables times the percent change in the product of the 
variables.  In term D, OECD’s approach computes the change in 
   •
X P X P
w w  attributable to 
•
w P as 
2
2 1 X X
P P
w w + •
 , where X1 and X2 are the values of X in the beginning and end years of 
the period of measurement.  Likewise, OECD computes the change in 
   •
X P X P
w w    attributable 
to 
•
X  as 
2
2 1
w w P P
X X
+ •
 , where 
w P 1 and 
w P2 are the values of P
w in the beginning and end years 
of measurement.  OECD (2002) explains the approach in greater detail, as well as gives the 
justification for the approach.
 






X , and 
•
t do not measure the isolated effect of a change in each of the 
variables on G, that is, they do not measure the effect on G assuming that the other variables 
remain unchanged.  Such an approach would result in the deficiency that the sum of the effects 
of the changes in the variables on G would not give the actual change in G, because it would 
leave out the changes in G caused by the multiplicative relationships.  Rather, the decomposition   20
equation yields effects for the variables based on all three variables changing simultaneously (or 
at least potentially changing).  As such, the effect values generated for the variables yield the 
attributable effect of their change on G. 
If PSEs have been computed for commodities, 
•
G  and the initial values of, and changes 
in, P
w and X needed to do the decomposition in equation (15) are available from the PSE 
database.  If PSEs have not been calculated, these data would have to be collected.  The one 
variable that must be computed is k, or alternatively e (since k = 1 – e).  e can be calculated 
directly from the base PSE data, such that   









          ( 1 6 )  








)] 1 ( [ t X P P




         ( 1 7 )  
As discussed before, if a tariff exists for a commodity, there are three possible ways G 
can change: 
(1)  a change in the tariff (the explicit policy effect); 
(2)  a change in P
w or X that interacts with the existing tariff (the implicit policy effect); 
            (3)  a change in P
w or X that interacts with undeveloped infrastructure to create 
       incomplete price transmission to P
d, thereby changing the price gap (the incomplete  
       transmission effect). 
 
The decomposition equation allows us to measure the extent to which changes in G can be 
attributed to changes in P
w, X, and t, classified according to each of the possible ways G can 
change listed above.  Given that 
•
G  in the decomposition equation is a percent change, the effect   21
of a change in a variable on G is measured in terms of the percent change in G. 
In term E in equation (15), the subterm associated with 
•
t measures the change in G from 
the explicit policy effect.  
•
t would change G by a percent equal to 
2 * 2 * )] 1 ( )[ (
) )( ( 2 1 2 1
t X P X P P






.  Also in term E, the corresponding subterms associated with 
•
w P  and 
•
X  measure the changes in G from the implicit policy effects (resulting from ∆P
w and 
∆X interacting with the tariff).  The magnitudes of these effects are all based on the assumption 
of complete transmission of the change in the landed price to P
d. 




X  , and 
•
t measure the change in G from 
the incomplete transmission effect (resulting from ∆P
w, ∆X, and ∆t interacting with undeveloped 
infrastructure to create incomplete price transmission to P
d).  Note that changes in not only P
w 
and X but also t can contribute to this effect.  A change in t will change the commodity’s landed 
price.  If only a part of the change in the landed price is transmitted to the domestic price, the 
change in t becomes the active element in creating the resulting price gap. 
How does one interpret the effects on G of 
•
w P  and 
•
X  in terms D and F?  If P
d equals the 
landed price [P
w X (1 + t)], term D becomes   
X P P





 .  Term D thereby equals term F, and 
the two terms cancel out.  If, however, P
d ≠   [P
w X (1 + t)], the two terms do not cancel.  ∆P
w 
and ∆X will now change G for yet another reason, in addition to those previously identified.  
Terms D and F can be combined into 
X P P
X P X P
t X P
















.  The assumption of   22
complete transmission of change in the landed price to the domestic price holds for term D, such 
that both P
d and [P
w X (1 + t)] will change by the same percentage. If  P
d  >  [P
w X (1 + t)], the 
domestic price initially exceeds the landed price, such that G is positive.  A rise in P
w or X of a 
given percentage which raises P
d by the same percentage will therefore increase the absolute 
value of the gap between P
d and [P
w X (1 + t)], simply because initially P
d  >  [P
w X (1 + t)].  
This will increase G.  Likewise, if  P
d  <  [P
w X (1 + t)], G is initially negative.  A rise in P
w or X 
will again increase the gap between [P
w X (1 + t)] and P
d.  The negative value of G will therefore 
increase.  This effect on G from ∆P
w and ∆X is called the price disparity effect. 
Recall that equation (4) gives G  =  P
w X t  +  D
p, where D
p (the price disparity) is the 
difference between the domestic and border prices that cannot be explained by policy 
intervention; that is, D
p  =  P
d  − P
w X (1 + t).
14  The price disparity effect therefore measures the 
effect on G from the initial existence of a price disparity.  The most likely reason why P
d might 
not initially equal the landed price [P
w X (1 + t)] is because of incomplete transmission between 
the two in an earlier period.  In fact, a country with poor price transmission from deficient 
infrastructure might never have equality between its domestic producer and import landed prices 
for commodities. 
A relationship might exist between the price disparity and incomplete transmission 
effects, such that they are not wholly independent of each other.  For example, if in a given year 
P
d  >  [P
w X (1 + t)], a price transmission elasticity of one would seem especially unrealistic.  
One might expect the actual transmission to be relatively low, such that it would narrow the gap 
between P
d and [P
w X (1 + t)].  Consequently, some of the price disparity effect and incomplete 
transmission effect might cancel out in the net effect.  Nonetheless, identifying the price disparity 
effect allows us to isolate and measure the policy effects.  It also allows a full accounting of   23
decomposition effects under the assumption of complete price transmission. 
Assume that initially D
p = 0, such that P
d  =  P
w X (1 + t).  In (15), terms D and F would 
drop out.  Assume also that complete transmission between P
w X (1 + t) and P
d exists, such that k 
= 0.  In equation (15), terms H and I would also drop out.  This would reduce equation (15) to 
term E, such that G would change solely because of policy effects (explicit and implicit). 
A contribution of our decomposition method is that it gives results based on the extreme 
assumption of complete transmission.  It thereby complements OECD’s decomposition of market 
price support, measured as the entire price gap, which is based on the opposite extreme 
assumption of absolutely no transmission.  Also, adding up the effects on G in our 
decomposition from the various attributable effects for the variables P
w, X, and t – that is, from 
all terms D, E, F, G, and H – will give the net effect of the change in each variable on G.  The 
sum of these net effects will in turn give the actual value of 
•
G .  This indicates that our method 
not only provides the complementary extreme measure of decomposition results to OECD’s 
method, but also gives the net (or actual) decomposition effects attributable to the variables, 
when the assumed complete transmission and the incomplete transmission that actually occur are 
netted out. 
 
Other Policies Allowing Transmission. 
The derivation of the decomposition equation when the tariff is a fixed per unit tax is 
similar to the derivation when the tariff is ad valorem.  The landed price of the imported good 
now equals [P
w X + T], where T equals the per unit tariff.  The only difference in the derivation 
compared to the ad valorem case is that in equation (8), one multiplies 
d d P P
•
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The final decomposition equation is 
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With a per unit tariff,  e now equals 







The analysis and use of equation (18) in measuring the shares of changes in the key 
variables in 
•
G  is largely the same as in the case involving an ad valorem tariff.  The main 
difference is that if the per unit tariff T is specified in the importing country’s own currency, a 
change in P
w or X carries no implicit policy effect.  Unlike an ad valorem tariff, a per unit tariff 
makes the value of the tariff paid per unit independent of the import price.  A change in P
w or X 
cannot change the per unit tariff. 
  How would our decomposition method handle a tariff rate quota (TRQ) for a 
commodity?  A TRQ is a two-tiered tariff, where a lower in-quota tariff is applied to a fixed 
volume of initial imports and a higher over-quota tariff is applied to all additional imports.  
TRQs are becoming increasingly common policy support instruments for countries.
15 
Because TRQs combine elements of a pure tariff and pure quota, any decomposition 
procedure for a TRQ would combine elements of the decomposition methods for these two types 
of policies.  A detailed examination of the decomposition method for a TRQ, with full equations,   25
is beyond the scope of this paper; rather, a general discussion of issues is given. 
A TRQ creates a kinked domestic supply curve for the commodity in question, divided 
into three parts.  The first part is a horizontal line anchored at the price which equals the border 
price plus the low in-quota tariff, with this line extending to the quota volume of imports allowed 
at the low in-quota tariff; the second part is the upward-sloping domestic supply curve for the 
commodity lying between the two horizontal parts; and the third part begins where the domestic 
supply curve intersects the horizontal line anchored at the price equal to the border price plus the 
above-quota tariff, and continues along this horizontal line indefinitely.
16 
  How one handles the decomposition depends on where one initially begins on the kinked 
supply curve.  The analysis becomes complicated if one moves between the three parts of the 
curve.  If one does not move, one uses the analysis specific either to a tariff (if on either of the 
horizontal parts of the supply curve) or to a quota (if on the upward-sloping part).  In the latter 
case, the OECD decomposition approach would be appropriate. 
  Skully (2001) shows that empirically, for most country/commodity pairings involving 
TRQs, the country is on the lower horizontal part of the commodity supply curve, and rarely are 
countries on the upper horizontal part.  The last point indicates that the high above-quota tariffs 
associated with TRQs are usually trade-prohibitive.  Skully also shows that empirically it is 
uncommon for countries with TRQs to move between the various parts of the supply curve.  This 
evidence indicates that decomposition analysis for countries with TRQs would usually not be 
difficult, requiring use of the decomposition method for either a pure tariff or pure quota. 
  Another policy that allows transmission from P
w and X to P
d is technical barriers to trade 
(TBTs), defined to include the large subcategory of sanitary and phyto-sanitary measures.
17  If a 
country imposes a TBT on imports of a commodity, the typical consequence is that foreign   26
suppliers must incur costs to satisfy the regulation.  If the per unit cost of satisfying the barrier is 
B, the landed price for the import in the country imposing the barrier is (P
w + B)X.  The equation 
for decomposing the change in G is 
P
X P P
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                                            (19) 
The decomposition method presented in this section can also be used if no trade policy 
exists.  Equation (19) can be used as the decomposition equation, but with B and 
•
B  both equal to 
0.  The decomposition would involve no policy effects, but would measure the price disparity 
and incomplete transmission effects on G from ∆P
w and ∆X. 
 
Some Qualifications. 
The decomposition analysis thus far assumes that the country in question is “small” in 
world markets – that is, it has no market power.  What is the effect on the decomposition if a 
country has market power in a commodity?  If it does, then an initial change in P
w would result 
in a countervailing change of some lesser degree in P
w in the opposite direction.  For example, if 
a country imports the commodity and P
w falls, the country would import more.  Because of its 
market power, this would raise world demand sufficiently to increase P
w to some  degree.  This 
reaction, however, requires no adjustment of our decomposition method.  The decomposition 
equation simply accepts the value of the final adjusted P
w to use in the decomposition. 
If a country has significant world market power and the policy variable (say a tariff rate) 
changes substantially, the change in domestic demand might alter world demand sufficiently to   27
change P
w.  The effect for the decomposition analysis is that some of the change in G would be 
incorrectly attributed to ∆P
w rather than to the change in policy.  A more likely interrelationship 
with market power is between X and P
w, given that exchange rates for developing and transition 
economies can change so substantially.  If a country has market power in a commodity as either 
an importer or exporter, a major appreciation or depreciation of its currency could substantially 
affect the world market for the commodity, thereby altering P
w.  Once again, the effect for the 
decomposition is that some of the change in G would be incorrectly attributed to ∆P
w rather than 
to ∆X.  The likelihood that countries have market power in certain commodities reinforces the 
argument that the exchange rate is the dominant variable in changing price gaps for agricultural 
products for developing and transition economies.  
The decomposition method presented in this section uses changes in only the nominal, 
rather than real, values of the variables between periods.  In this paper, we follow OECD in its 
decomposition of PSEs, in that OECD decomposes in only nominal terms (though it is 
considering in future providing decomposition in real as well as nominal terms).  Our 
decomposition could also be done in real as well as nominal terms, though a full explanation and 
demonstration of the decomposition in real terms is beyond the scope of this paper.  The key step 
would be to adjust G and P
d in the end year of measurement by the change in domestic prices 
over the period (if there were inflation, to deflate using the domestic price index); adjust P
w  in 
the end year by the appropriate foreign price index; and convert the change in X from nominal to 
real terms by multiplying the nominal rate in the end year by the foreign price index and dividing 
by the domestic price index 
 
Empirical Example: The Price Gap for Russian Poultry 
   28
  This section demonstrates the decomposition method when policy allows transmission, 
the decomposition example being the change in G for Russian poultry producers over the period 
1997-99.  Since the mid 1990’s, poultry has been Russia’s biggest agricultural import 
commodity (in value terms).  The period 1997-99 is chosen because it spans Russia’s economic 
crisis that hit in 1998.  One effect of the crisis was a severe depreciation in the ruble, which gives 
the example the interesting feature of major change in the exchange rate.  The two year period 
1997-99 is used because the crisis hit in August of 1998, such that much of the crisis’ economic 
effects (on domestic prices and exchange rates, among other variables) did not play out until 
1999. 
During the transition period, Russia’s main agricultural trade support policy has been 
import tariffs.  During 1997-99, Russia had in place a 30 percent tariff on imported poultry, 
though with the condition that a minimum tariff be applied of 0.3 European Currency Units 
(ECUs) per kilo of imports (or 300 ECUs per metric ton).  The tariff rate and minimum per unit 
tariff did not change over the period (Russian Federation State Customs Committee). 
For all three years 1997, 1998, and 1999, unit values computed for Russian poultry 
imports show that if an ad valorem tariff were applied, it would yield per kilo tariffs below the 
minimum requirement of 0.3 ECUs (0.19, 0.19, and 0.18 ECUs for the three years, respectively.)  
A per unit import tariff policy therefore in effect existed, which means we should use the 
decomposition equation for a per unit tariff (equation (18)).  An important feature of this 
minimum per unit tariff is that the tariff value was denominated in ECUs, rather than rubles.  
This means that the imported poultry’s landed price should be specified not as (P
w X  + T), but 
rather as (P
w X  + T X), or alternatively (P
w + T) X, where X is the exchange rate between the 
ruble and the ECU (which in 1999 became the euro).  In deriving the decomposition equation, in   29
equation (8), one now multiplies
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                                     (20) 
The point was made earlier that if a per unit tariff is denominated in domestic currency, a 
change in P
w or X carries no implicit policy effect, because the per unit tariff makes the tariff 
independent of the import price.  A change in P
w or X therefore can not change the per unit tariff.  
Specifying the per unit tariff in a foreign currency, however, makes the domestic currency value 
of the tariff dependent on the exchange rate (through the term (T X)), such that a change in X can 
change the domestic currency value of the tariff.  In this case, a change in X has an implicit 
policy effect on G, as our empirical example will demonstrate. 
Throughout Russia’s transition period, agricultural imports from the other NIS countries 
of the former USSR have not been assigned any tariffs.  In our decomposition, however, we 
assess the tariff on all poultry imports.  The empirical harm to our decomposition results from 
doing so is insignificant, given that Russian poultry imports from other NIS countries have been 
trivial, in 1997-99 comprising less than 0.5 percent of Russia’s total poultry imports in volume 
terms (Russian Federation State Customs Committee). 
In our decomposition approach, the policy variable (T in this example) is intended to 
represent all state policy that can affect the price gap.  
•
T  would then measure the effect of a   30
change in policy on G (though in our specific example T does not change).  During the second 
half of the 1990s, Russia’s sole policy at the federal level that affected the price gap for poultry 
was the import tariff.  However, regional governments throughout the transition period have 
interfered in local agricultural and food markets, typically in an ad hoc and nontransparent 
manner, such as by fixing or influencing prices or restricting the movement of agricultural 
products out of their region.
18  Such policies could affect domestic producer prices, and thereby 
the price gap for the affected commodities within regions.  Yet, these policies have been most 
strong for grain and dairy products, less so for poultry.  Also, determining the aggregate direction 
of bias of these various ad hoc policies, much less measuring their effect on our decomposition 
results, would be virtually impossible. 
In 1999 and 2000, Russia received food aid from the United States and EU, which was 
motivated by the country’s dismal 1998 grain harvest (48 million metric tons, the lowest in 
decades) and concern that the economic crisis that struck in 1998 would deprive the country of 
the financial resources to pay for necessary food imports.
19  Food aid inflows were not assessed 
tariffs.  The nontariffed food aid almost certainly had some downward effect on Russian 
producer prices for the affected commodities.  The Russian government’s willingness and desire 
to accept food aid can be considered a “policy” decision.  The food aid’s negative effect on 
domestic producer prices can therefore be viewed as a policy action that changed the price gap.  
This point complicates our decomposition analysis, as T in our example (unchanged in value, no 
less) no longer represents all federal government policy that might have affected the price gap. 
Given the timing of poultry food aid shipments to Russia, however, this problem is not 
serious for our decomposition.   In 1999, Russian poultry consumption was 1.84 mmt (USDA).  
As part of the U.S. food aid package, Russia was to receive 50,000 tons of poultry (the EU   31
package did not contain any poultry). Virtually none of the U.S. poultry given to Russia reached 
domestic markets in 1999.  No poultry had reached Russian ports by September 1999, and by the 
end of October only 11,2000 tons had arrived in ports (Interfax, Oct. 30 – Nov. 5, 1999, p. 4).  
Given that it took 1-2 months for the poultry to be off-loaded, transported to domestic markets, 
and made available for retail sale, hardly any poultry food aid was sold in 1999.  The poultry 
therefore did not have time to distort the domestic price data used in our decomposition analysis.  
However, whatever small downward effect the donated poultry might have had on 1999 prices 
would have the effect of understating the contribution of “policy” changes to the change in G. 
The first step in generating the decomposition results is to compute the PTE (e) between 
the landed price [(P
w + T) X] and the producer price P
d.  The value is 46 percent.
20  Table 1 gives 
the decomposition, which incorporates this transmission value.  The column 
•
V  gives the actual 
percent change in G and the variables that determine G (computed from OECD’s database for 
Russian PSEs, OECD).  The column shows that from 1997 to 1999 the price gap for Russian 
poultry rose 36 percent.  The poultry producer price P
d increased 117 percent, the minimum per 
unit import tariff T remained unchanged, the poultry border price P
w (expressed in ECUs) fell 16 
percent, and the ruble/ECU exchange rate X rose 300 percent (largely as a consequence of the 
1998 economic crisis). 
The other columns measure the degree to which changes in these variables change G, 
measured by the percent change in G.  The three columns under “e + k = 1” give the effects on G 
based on the assumption that transmission from the change in the landed price to producer price 
is complete (equal to 1).  The column under “policy effect” measures the explicit and implicit 
effects on G from changes involving the tariff.  Because the minimum per unit tariff does not 
change over the period, there is no explicit policy effect (the value in the column associated with   32
T equals 0).  However, as explained before, because the tariff is expressed in ECUs rather than 
rubles, the change in X results in an implicit policy effect.  X is expressed as rubles per ECU, 
which means the 300 percent increase in X raises the import tax expressed in rubles.  The 
“attributable” effect is to increase the price gap, by 142 percent.  
Recall that the price disparity effect of a change in P
w or X on G occurs when the 
producer price and landed price for the commodity differ in the beginning year of the period of 
measurement.  In 1997, Russia’s average producer price for poultry was 12.4 million rubles per 
ton, while the landed price for imported poultry was 7.0 million rubles (computed from OECD’s 
database for Russian PSEs, OECD).  The fact that the producer price differed so substantially 
from the landed price is consistent with the price transmission elasticity of 46 percent, in that 
both results show that Russian internal markets for poultry were imperfectly integrated into the 
world poultry market.  Such a large disparity also supports the arguments of Barrett, Barrett and 
Li, and Fackler and Goodwin that in developing and transition economies, undeveloped market 
infrastructure, and in particular the problem of imperfect information, can result in price 
disequilibrium of some duration whereby gaps between border and domestic producer prices 
cannot be wholly explained by policy measures and transport/transaction costs. 
In our example, P
w falls.  With complete transmission, the drop in P
w decreases P
d by 
more than the landed price (in absolute value).  Table 1 shows that the effect is to reduce G by 21 
percent.  Analogously, the 300 percent rise in X with complete transmission raises P
d more than 
it raises the landed price.  The effect is to increase G by 145 percent.  Table 1 shows that the 
aggregate price disparity effect from the changes in P
w and X is to raise G by 124 percent.  The 
combined effect of the changes in P
w and X given the assumption of complete price transmission 
is to increase G by 266 percent.   33
 The  column  “− k” measures the incomplete transmission effect on M which results from 
changes in variables that affect the domestic producer price interacting with incomplete 
transmission.  The fall in P
w reduces P
d.  Because of incomplete transmission, however, P
d falls 
less than it would with complete transmission.  The failure of P
d to drop by its potential 
maximum has the attributable effect of raising G by 26 percentage points.  Likewise, the rise in 
X increases P
d.  Yet, because of incomplete transmission, P
d rises less than it potentially could.  
The failure of P
d to rise by its potential maximum has the attributable effect of decreasing G by 
256 percentage points.  The aggregate effect of the changes in P
w and X combining with 
incomplete transmission (not caused by policies that fix domestic prices) is to decrease G by 230 
percent. 
  The column “e” gives the net effect of changes in the causal variables on G.  It equals the 
values in the column “combined effect” under “e + k = 1” and the column “− k.”  The results 
show that the net attributable effect of the drop in P
w is to increase G by 5 percent, while the net 
attributable effect of the rise in X is to increase G by 31 percent.  The total net effect is to raise G 
36 percent. 
  We can also use the results in table 1 to demonstrate the difference between our 
decomposition of G and OECD’s decomposition of the market price support part (M) of the PSE.  
Recall that in its work on PSEs, OECD includes the entire price gap in M, that is, M = G.  This 
means that in OECD’s decomposition, the value of 
•
M to be decomposed exactly equals the 
value 
•
G  to be decomposed in our decomposition of the price gap.  As discussed before, OECD’s 
method for decomposing the change in M treats all the variables in the decomposition as being 
independent, and also is not geared to policy analysis.  Interpreting the results of the 
decomposition therefore must be done carefully, especially when policy allows transmission   34
from ∆P
w and ∆X to P
d.  The column “OECD decomp” in table 1 gives the decomposition of 
•
G  
using OECD’s decomposition method.  Just as P
d is not a relevant variable for our decomposition 
approach, T is not a relevant variable for OECD’s decomposition.  With OECD’s decomposition, 
the rise in P
d increases M (G) by 197 percent, the fall in P
w increases M by 27 percent (because it 
lowers the border price), and the rise in X decreases M by 188 percent (because it raises the 
border price). 
  Note that our decomposition approach yields not only substantially different results for 
the effect of the changes in P
w and X on G than does OECD’s decomposition, but even produces 
a different sign for the net effect of the change in X on G.  Clearly a relationship exists between 
the large negative value for the effect of the change in X on G from our incomplete transmission 
effect and from OECD’s decomposition approach.  The OECD approach yields a negative value 
for the effect of the change in X on M (G) because it assumes no transmission from the change in 
X to P
d.  In OECD’s approach, the big increase in the border price measured in rubles that results 
from the large change in X (the ruble depreciation) has the attributable effect of substantially 
reducing G, but without any consideration for the fact that much of the change in X is 
transmitted to P
d (given that e = 46 percent).  Because our approach allows transmission from the 
change in X to P
d, we get a positive net effect for the change in X on G. 
  As discussed earlier, the annual unit values for poultry imports computed from the 
official Russian trade data for 1997, 1998, and 1999 result in values too low for the ad valorem 
tariff of 30 percent to have been assessed.  Rather, such values would have triggered the 
minimum per unit tariff for poultry of 0.3 ECUs per kilo.  However, for either seasonal reasons 
or because some of the imported poultry might have been of higher quality and therefore had a 
higher unit value (Russian poultry imports not being completely homogeneous), some of the   35
imported poultry might have been assessed the ad valorem rather than per unit tariff. 
We also discussed earlier that Russia’s acceptance of Western food aid would complicate 
our decomposition analysis.  The food aid would affect the price gap for a commodity by 
lowering the domestic producer price, and could therefore be interpreted as a state policy which 
should be integrated into the decomposition analysis.  As discussed earlier, very little of the 
Western poultry food aid that Russia received in 1999 arrived early enough to be available for 
sale within the country in that year.  The food aid’s effect on domestic prices in 1999 was 
therefore slight.  However, to capture the effects of both the possible use of the ad valorem tariff 
for some of the imported poultry, and the negative effect that food aid might have had on 
domestic prices in 1999, we again decompose the price gap for Russian poultry imports over 
1997-99, but this time using an ad valorem import tariff (table 2). 
We also lower the tariff rate below that which actually existed in 1999.  The negative 
effect on the domestic producer price of our lowering the tariff represents the fall in P
d from the 
poultry food aid.  The Russian ad valorem poultry import tariff of 30 percent did not change over 
our period of measurement.  To capture the negative effect on P
d from food aid, we cut the 1999 
tariff rate by half, reducing it to 15 percent.  Thus, in column 
•
V  in table 2, t declines by 50 
percent. 
These decomposition results therefore give the opposite extreme measure of the possible 
decomposition compared to the results from the other example, given the special policy and trade 
conditions that existed during the period covered.  The extremity of the example is reinforced by 
the fact that we assume the ad valorem tariff is applied to all the poultry imports.  This 
decomposition example also has the benefit of demonstrating how the decomposition works in 
the case of an ad valorem tariff.   36
 The landed price in this case equals [P
w X (1 + t)], where t is the tariff rate.  The 
transmission from the change in the landed price to P
d now equals 0.59, compared to 0.46 when 
the minimum per unit tariff was used.  This lower value for e occurs because the halving of the 
tariff rate reduces the calculated change in the landed price.  Given that this example uses the 
same change in P
d as in the previous example, a smaller change in the landed price will generate 
higher transmission. 
In table 2, the column 
•
V  is unchanged from table 1, except that the tariff rate t replaces 
the per unit tariff T as the policy variable.  The column “policy effect” when transmission is 
complete (e + k = 1) shows that the tariff cut has the explicit policy effect of reducing G by 44 
percent.  As examined earlier, with an ad valorem tariff, a change in both P
w and X creates an 
implicit policy effect on G, because it changes the value of the import to be assessed the tariff 
rate.  The implicit policy effect of the drop in P
w is to lower G by 12 percent, while the implicit 
effect of the rise in X is to raise G by 80 percent.  The aggregate result of these various policy 
effects is to increase G 24 percent. 
The changes in P
w and X also have price disparity effects that result from the fact that P
d 
exceeds the landed price, now measured as [P
w X (1 + t)].  The fall in P
w decreases G by 24 
percent, while the rise in X increases G by 169 percent, with the aggregate price disparity effect 
being a rise in G of 145 percent. The combined effect of changes in all variables if transmission 
were complete would be to increase G 169 percent. 
The column “− k” shows that only part of the potential rise in G that would occur with 
complete transmission is realized.  Each figure in this column for a specific variable 
understandably has a different sign than the corresponding figure in the column “total effect” 
under “e + k = 1” (as was also the case in table 1).  For example, 18 percentage points of the   37
potential 44 percent fall in G that would result from the halving of the tariff rate does not 
materialize because incomplete transmission prevents P
d from falling to the maximum extent 
possible.  The net effect of incomplete transmission is to result in G falling (or put differently, 
failing to rise) by 133 percent. 
The column “e” once again gives the net effect of the change in each variable on G − that 
is, the results based on the actual price transmission embodied in the data.  Because t and P
w fall, 
the net effect of the change in these variables is to reduce G, while the rise in X generates an 
increase in G.  The large change in X dominates the changes in the two other variables, such that 
the final impact is to raise G 36 percent. 
Comparing the results in column “e” in table 2 with those in table 1 when the per unit 
tariff holds shows that the change in the ad valorem tariff adds an explicit policy effect; the fall 
in P
w has a negative rather than positive net attributable effect on G, because the drop in P
w 
combines with the ad valorem tariff to create a negative implicit policy effect; and the change in 
X remains the dominant factor in changing G. 
The column “OECD decomp” again presents the results using OECD’s approach for 
decomposing 
•
M , unchanged from the previous example.  Comparison of the results in column 
“e” and OECD’s results again shows that not only do the two approaches yield substantially 
different results for the net effect of the changes in P
d and X on G, but that the signs for the 
effects are different.  The main explanation again is that the OECD approach assumes no 
transmission from changes in P
w, X, and t to P
d, while our approach is based on the actual 
transmission that occurs. 
Our decomposition method strongly complements and fills out the OECD approach.  
OECD’s approach yields decomposition results based on the assumption of no transmission,   38
while our approach yields results based on the opposite extreme assumption of complete 
transmission, as well as results based on the actual transmission that occurs. 
The empirical point we wish to demonstrate in these examples involving Russian 
agriculture is that the dominant factor in changing the price gap was the large depreciation in the 
exchange rate, acting in combination with poor transmission which resulted from undeveloped 
market infrastructure.  In the example using the per unit tariff, if complete transmission had 
existed, the rise in X would have increased G by 287 percent.  Incomplete transmission, 
however, prevented 256 percentage points of this potential rise, such that the net attributable 
effect of the rise in X was to increase G by only 31 percent.  The example using the ad valorem 
tariff shows that if complete transmission had existed, the rise in X would have increased G by 
249 percent.  Incomplete transmission prevented 177 percentage points of this potential rise, 
such that the actual effect of the rise in X was to increase G by 72 percent.  A more general 
demonstration of the importance of the exchange rate in the decomposition is that in every 
column in tables 1 and 2, the change in X dominates the aggregate effect of the changes in all 
variables on G. 
These decomposition examples are based on the assumption that Russia did not have 
market power in the world poultry market in the late 1990s.  The evidence, however, suggests 
otherwise.  In 1997, Russia accounted for about a third of world poultry imports (USDA), 
enough to give it market power.  Russia’s exchange rate depreciated substantially in 1997-99.  
The plunge in the ruble’s value significantly raised Russian domestic poultry prices, thereby 
reducing demand.  Given Russia’s world market power, the drop in its demand for poultry could 
by itself have reduced the price at which it imported poultry.  This could account for part of the 
actual drop in P
w for poultry of 16 percent in the decomposition examples.  Given that the   39
depreciation in the exchange rate probably caused some of the fall in P
w, the effect of the change 
in the exchange rate on the price gap is even greater than that indicated by the decomposition 
results.  
Our two empirical examples are limited to Russian poultry over 1997-99.  Admittedly, 
during this period the exchange rate depreciated substantially.  Nonetheless, we can argue that 
changes in the exchange rate combined with poor transmission have been the dominant factor 
driving changes in price gaps for Russian agricultural commodities during transition.  From 1992 
to 2003, the average annual percent change in Russia’s nominal exchange rate (ruble to the U.S. 
dollar) was 36 percent (PlanEcon).  This calculation in fact excludes the huge depreciation in the 
exchange rate from 1991 to 1992 (the first year of economic reform).  Exchange rate changes of 
course affect the price gap for all commodities. 
 
Limitations of the Decomposition Procedure 
Given that an objective of our procedure is to isolate and measure the effect on the price 
gap of changes in government policies targeted to agriculture (both the explicit and implicit 
effects), versus the effect of changes in nonpolicy variables, our approach has the burden of 
identifying and integrating into the decomposition all such policies.  It appears this is a 
manageable challenge for handling conventional national trade support policies, such as tariffs, 
quotas, tariff rate quotas, and managed prices (which typically involve variable tariffs), and 
perhaps state trading and technical barriers to trade as well.  However, Russia’s experience 
illustrates a special policy measurement problem, common to NIS countries, which is that 
regional governments can pursue their own agricultural price and market policies within their 
jurisdictions.  Such market interference is often nontransparent, and therefore might not be   40
“captureable” by the policy variable in our decomposition. 
Nontransparent regional policies (as well as any other nontransparent agricultural 
policies) would most likely affect the price gap through P
d.  If not captured by the policy effect 
in our decomposition, the effects on P
d would be attributed to incomplete price transmission 
resulting from deficient market infrastructure.  This problem notwithstanding, results generated 
by our decomposition methods which at minimum isolate and measure the effects of countries’ 
transparent national trade policies would be useful.  Also, even if one cannot wholly separate out 
the effects of policy as opposed to deficient market infrastructure (or any other possible cause) 
on price transmission, our procedure has the merit of measuring the effect of incomplete 
transmission on the price gap, regardless of cause.  Likewise, any inability to distinguish 
between the effects of policy and deficient infrastructure on transmission does not tarnish the 
calculations that give the effects of changes in P
w and X on G (as presented in tables 1 and 2). 
Another limitation of our procedure is that transmission from a major change in P
w or X 
to P
d might take not just one year to play out fully, but rather a number of years.
21  If the 
decomposition  is used to compute annual changes, then the effect attributed to a change in a 
variable over a single year of measurement might contain effects from changes in variables in 
previous years. 
This problem would not mar the decomposition effects based on the assumption of 
complete transmission − that is, in tables 1 and 2 it would not tarnish the decomposition results 
in the columns under “e + k = 1.”  This is because these results are based on the strict assumption 
that whatever values exist in the base year of the measurement period, complete transmission 
occurs over the period.  If, however, transmission from changes in variables earlier than the base 
year of measurement (say in our examples for Russia, changes in P
w or X in 1996) carry over to   41
the period of measurement, this carry-over transmission will affect the decomposition for the 
column “− k.”  The results for this column will measure not only effects of changes in variables 
that have occurred since the base year of measurement, but also effects on P
d (and therefore on 
G) from changes in variables before the base year.  The carry-over effects in column “− k” for a 
specific variable (say X) will not necessarily be confined to the earlier change in that variable 
alone, but could contain effects from earlier changes in other variables as well.  Any marring of 
the results in column “− k” will also affect the net results in column “e.” 
A point that mitigates the harm caused by this problem is that the decomposition results 
are the most interesting and important when either policy, or the variables P
w and X, change 
substantially.  This means that the base year in the decomposition analysis will be one of relative 
price and policy stability.  If so, there would be little inherited transmission from changes in 
variables in the years preceding the base year of calculation.  In computing the decomposition 
effects after major changes in variables, the most informative and least distorting approach 
would be to compute results always using the same base year (which should be the year of 
relative stability preceding the year of major change).  In our example, we could compute 
changes from 1997 to 1998, 1997 to 1999, and 1997 to 2000.  This would give a year-by-year 
record of how the decomposition effects materialize, as transmission plays out over time.  An 
empirical point which supports this approach is that countries’ exchange rates tend not to 
fluctuate severely in opposite direction from year to year, but rather move cyclically, with the 
trough to peak (or peak to trough) period typically lasting a number of years. 
In our Russian poultry examples, 1996 and 1997 were also years of relative stability in 
the nominal exchange rate, the average annual change in 1996-97 being 13 percent compared to 
138 percent over 1993-95.  Russia during the transition period has also been a good example of a   42
country whose exchange rate moves in 2-4 year cycles. 
 
Conclusion 
  This paper presents two different methods for decomposing changes in price gaps for 
agricultural commodities.  One method is appropriate when policy precludes any transmission 
from changes in border prices or exchange rates to domestic producer prices, as in the case of 
managed prices, trade quotas, and state trading.  The other decomposition method is appropriate 
when policy allows transmission, as in the case of tariffs, tariff rate quotas, and technical barriers 
to trade. 
The decomposition methods allow one to identify and measure the following reasons why 
price gaps can change: (1) an explicit policy effect whereby the change in a policy variable 
directly alters the price gap; (2) an implicit policy effect, whereby a change in the border price or 
exchange rate combines with an existing policy to change the gap; and (3) the incomplete 
transmission effect, whereby a change in policy, border price, or exchange rate combines with 
incomplete transmission to alter the price gap, and where deficient market infrastructure rather 
than policy interference is responsible for the incomplete transmission.  The last effect exists 
only when policy allows transmission from changes in border prices and exchange rates to 
domestic prices, and is especially relevant for developing and transition economies. 
We apply the methods to decompose the change in the price gap for Russian poultry 
producers over the period 1997-99.  We find that the dominant factor in changing the price gap 
was the large depreciation in Russia’s exchange rate, acting in combination with poor 
transmission which resulted from undeveloped market infrastructure.  Russia’s exchange rate has 
fluctuated throughout the transition period (though in cycles).  This supports the argument that   43
the oscillating exchange rate, through the incomplete transmission effect, has been the driving 
force in changing price gaps for Russian agricultural commodities during transition.  Fluctuating 
exchange rates and poor market infrastructure are key features of developing and transition 
economies in general.  This suggests that the combination of these two features through the 
incomplete transmission effect could be the main cause of changes in their agricultural price 
gaps. 
   The decomposition methods allow one to determine the degree to which changes in 
agriculture-targeted trade policies affect the price gap, as opposed to changes in border prices 
and the exchange rate.  The methods are therefore relevant to the current debate concerning what 
policies countries should adopt, especially in the developing and transition worlds, in order to 
reduce differences between world commodity prices and their domestic prices, expand foreign 
trade to capture more of the potential gains from trade, and integrate more strongly into world 
markets.  Much attention focuses on the high tariffs and other trade restrictions imposed by many 
developing countries.  However, the analysis and results presented in this paper are consistent 
with the argument that the main cause of changes in agricultural price gaps in developing and 
transition economies is fluctuating exchange rates combined with undeveloped infrastructure that 
weakens transmission, and the paper presents methods for testing this hypothesis for specific 
countries.  If this argument holds, the policy implication would be that strengthening 
macroeconomic stability and improving domestic market infrastructure might do more to reduce 
price gaps, and their economic effects, than liberalizing agricultural trade policies. 
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Endnotes 
 
1 For discussion of deficient infrastructure in developing countries, see FAO, and in 
transition economies World Bank (2004).  Wehrheim et al. (2000) argues that poor institutional 
infrastructure is the biggest problem facing Russian agriculture, which could also be the case for 
other New Independent States (NIS) of the former USSR. 
2 These authors acknowledge that empirical work involving trade policy and market 
integration (both between foreign and domestic markets and between regional markets within 
countries) often makes the simplifying assumption that market equilibrium exists (that is, D
p = 
0).  This allows one to attribute price gaps largely to policy intervention. 
 
3 Just as empirical work often assumes that market equilibrium exists, work involving 
trade protection, market integration, and price transmission also typically assumes that 
transport/transaction costs are constant, either in absolute terms or as a proportion of border 
prices (see Fackler and Goodwin (2001) for discussion of the issue).  This obviates the often 
empirically difficult task of computing these costs.  The two assumptions together also allow one 
in empirical work to attribute changes in price gaps to changes in policy. 
4 Although OECD begins its decomposition of change in M with M as P
d  −  P
w X, if 
domestic transport/transaction costs exist, M for an import should equal P
d + C
d  −  P
w X  −  C
m, 
and for an export P
d + C
d  −  P
w X.  OECD usually assumes that either C
d and C
m are fixed, or in 
the case when the commodity is imported, that C
d = C
m (assumptions that we also make in this 
paper).  With either assumption (fixed or equal costs), C
d and C
m would drop out of the 
decomposition of the change in M.  An example of OECD’s approach is that, in computing M 
for non-OECD countries, OECD assumes for an imported commodity that the cost, insurance, 
freight (cif) value for the import plus C
m equals C
d plus an adjustment for the inferior quality of   45
the domestic product compared to the import (Melyukhina 2002). 
5 The only major qualification to the equivalence between our definition of G and 
OECD's definition of M is that the latter also involves a feed adjustment coefficient.  This comes 
into existence when the animal feed used in producing livestock products is itself supported or 
taxed through market price policies.  For example, if a country supports its feed producers such 
that domestic feed prices lay above border prices, domestic livestock producers are taxed 
because they have to pay higher prices for feed.  This tax should be subtracted from M for 
livestock producers to give an “adjusted” value of their market price support.  Because we are 
interested in measuring a commodity’s price gap rather than the support that the commodity’s 
producers receive, we do not include any feed adjustment for livestock products.  For a brief 
description of OECD’s method for decomposing the change in M, see OECD (2005).  For a more 
detailed description, see OECD (2002). 
6 Throughout the postwar period, the United States, EU, and other OECD countries have 
administered a variety of managed price policies that in effect fixed domestic producer prices.  
The most common agricultural price support policy for the EU has been the intervention 
purchasing program, and for the United States the commodity loan program.  In recent years, 
however, the United States and EU have been moving away from price support to direct income 
support for farmers (decoupled from production).  For a discussion of EU and U.S. farm policies, 
see Normile, Effland, and Young (2004) and Kelch and Normile (2004). 
7 For discussion and analysis of state trading, see Ackerman and Dixit (1999). 
8 For example, assume that a country has a managed price policy which keeps the 
domestic producer price for a commodity (P
d) fixed at $400.  The border price (P
w X) initially is 
$300, which results in per unit market price support of $100.  P
w then increases such that the   46
border price rises to $350.  Per unit support falls to $50.  The drop in support has been implicit 
rather than explicit, because the policy variable (the managed price of $400) has not changed. 
9 Managed price policies also can, and in fact often do, involve tariffs.  If the managed 
price for a commodity exceeds the world price, a tariff equal to the difference is often used to 
“defend” the domestic price. The tariffs are reactive, in that they are set in response to the 
managed prices, and must be altered in response to changes in P
w and X.  The tariffs, therefore, 
do not allow transmission from changes in P
w and X to P
d, but rather are part of the policy 
instrument set that maintains the managed prices.  A prime example are the variable tariffs 
maintained by the EU. 
    10 For discussion of agricultural trade policy in transition economies see World Bank 
(2004), as well as the various agricultural country reports on transition economies by OECD 
(such as OECD 1998).  For discussion of agricultural trade policy in developing countries, as 
well as in transition economies that are WTO members, see WTO. 
11 Tyers and Anderson (1992) and Quiroz and Soto (1995) find that price transmission 
elasticities for most country-commodity pairings for developing and transition economies are 
below 50 percent, and for many pairings below 25 percent.  Mundlak and Larson (1992) find that 
transmission for most countries is much higher than that found in other work.  Yet, Quiroz and 
Soto argue that the high transmission results of Mundlak and Larson stem mainly from a serious 
problem of positive autocorrelation, a problem that the former avoid in their own study by using 
a dynamic error correction model.  Although the low transmission found by Tyers and Anderson 
and Quiroz and Soto could result in part from policy interference, it also is consistent with poor 
infrastructure. 
12 During their early transition years, all the countries of the former Soviet bloc   47
experienced huge changes in their exchange rate.  The rates then began to stabilize, though 
Russia’s economic crisis of 1998 destabilized not only its own exchange rate but also that of 
most other NIS countries.  From 1992 to 2003, the average annual change in Russia’s and 
Ukraine’s nominal exchange rate with the U.S. dollar was 36 and 183 percent, respectively 
(these figures exclude the tremendous depreciation in both currencies during the initial transition 
year of 1992; PlanEcon).  Developing country exchange rates have become somewhat more 
stable in recent years, as a number of countries have pegged their currencies to the U.S. dollar.  
Yet, as Argentina’s recent experience shows, currency pegging does not preclude financial crisis, 
which usually brings extreme currency depreciation.  For discussion of exchange rate market and 
policy developments in developing and transition economies, see United Nations (1998) and 
Braga de Macedo, Cohen, and Reisen (2001). 
13 For example, let P
w = 50, X = 2, and tariff rate (t) = 0.2, such that P
d = 120 and M = 20.  
If X increases by 50% to 3, (P
w X) increases by 50% to 150, P
d by 50% to 180, and M by 50% to 
30.  By assuming no transmission, the OECD decomposition method would misvalue the effect 
of the change in X on M.  The OECD method would calculate that the effect of ∆X on M is –50, 
the negative of (P
w = 50) * (∆X = 1) = 50, and that the effect of ∆P
d on M is 60.  The net effect 
on M is an increase of 10.  What has in fact happened is that the full 50% rise in X has been 
transmitted as a 50% rise in P
d, such that P
d increases by 60 to 180.  With a tariff of 20 percent, 
10 of the increase in P
d of 60 results from the tariff policy.  The tariff has not changed, but its 
existence combined with the rise in X increases M by 10.  This measures the net effect of ∆X on 
M, which incorporates the combined effects of the rise in X, the transmission of ∆X to M, and 
the existence of the tariff.  From the point of view of Tangermann’s discussion of explicit versus 
implicit policy effects, the rise in M is an implicit policy effect of the tariff, in that the rise in X   48
could not increase M without the tariff.  Note that the OECD method would not only severely 
overstate the effect of  ∆X on M in absolute value, but also get the direction of change in M 
wrong (-50 versus +10). 
14 Recall also that equation (4) rests on the assumption that internal transport/transaction 
costs for imported and domestic products are equal. 
15 For analysis of how TRQs affect the domestic market for a commodity, as well as 
empirical examination of the nature and prevalence of TRQs in world agricultural trade, see 
Skully (2001). 
16 This analysis is based on the “small-country” assumption, whereby a country’s trade 
volumes are too small to affect the prices at which it trades.  This accounts for the horizontal 
parts of the supply curve. 
17 For examination of the market effects of TBTs, see Roberts, Josling and Orden (1999). 
18 Regional governments have restricted product outflows rather than inflows, typically 
when poor harvests have raised concerns over local food security.  Such restrictions violate 
federal law, though enforcement has been difficult (Interfax). 
19 Russia received over 3 million metric tons (mmt) of commodities from the United 
States, worth about $1.1 billion, and around 1.8 mmt from the EU, worth almost $0.5 billion 
(Liefert and Liefert 1999). 
20 Such a low transmission value is consistent with the findings of empirical work that 
estimates transmission between border prices and exchange rates and Russian food prices 
(Osborne and Liefert 2004) and the transmission of changes in food prices between regions 
within Russia (DeMasi and Koen 1996, Goodwin, Grennes and McCurdy 1999, and Loy and 
Wehrheim 1999).   49
21 The decomposition examples for Russian poultry can be used to illustrate the point.  If 
the per unit poultry tariff is operative, the transmission elasticity from the change in the landed 
price to domestic producer price over 1997-99 is 46 percent.  The transmission elasticity 
computed from 1997 to 1998 is lower at 33 percent, while the elasticity computed from 1997 to 
2000 is higher at 66 percent.  The change in P
d for poultry from the big ruble depreciation caused 
by the 1998 economic crisis clearly took a few years to play out.   50
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World Trade Organization (WTO). Trade Policy Reviews. Geneva, periodical by country.Table 1: Decomposition of Change in Price Gap for Russian Poultry, 1997-99: Per Unit Tariff 
Contribution of  
•
V  to 
•
G  
1 = + k e   Variable  ) (V  
•
V  













d P   117  na  na  na  na       na   197 
T   0  0  0  0  0              0  na 
w P   -16  0  -21  -21  26         5  27 
X   300  142  145  287  -256            31  -188 
 
G   36  142  124  266  -230            36  36 
 
Note: 
d P  is a relevant variable for only OECD’s decomposition method, and T is relevant for only our method.  “na” means not applicable. 
Source: For  
•
V , database for Russian PSEs (OECD). For contribution of 
•
V  to 
•
G , own calculations.   54
Table 2: Decomposition of Change in Price Gap for Russian Poultry, 1997-99: Ad Valorem Tariff 
Contribution of  
•
V  to 
•
G  
1 = + k e   Variable  ) (V  
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V  













d P   117  na  na  na  na        na  197 
t   -50  -44  0  -44  18       -26  na 
w P   -16  -12  -24  -36  26      -10  27 
X   300  80  169  249  -177       72  -188 
 
G   36  24  145  169  -133      36  36 
 
Note: 
d P  is a relevant variable for only OECD’s decomposition method, and t  is relevant for only our method.  “na” means not applicable. 
Source: For  
•
V , database for Russian PSEs (OECD). For contribution of 
•
V  to 
•
G , own calculations. 
 